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1 
Developing U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and 
International Law:  The Approach of the 
Obama Administration* 
Winston P. Nagan 
Erin K. Slemmens† 
Prior U.S. presidential administrations have developed and adhered to the nuclear weapons 
policy of nuclear deterrence.  This policy was largely conditioned by the Cold War and the fact that 
the U.S. Cold War adversary was a major threat to U.S. security because of its nuclear capability.  
The policy of nuclear deterrence worked on the principle of mutually assured destruction.  It 
appears to have had the effect of discouraging recourse to nuclear weapons as instruments of war.  
It has also been generally perceived as a position that has an uneasy relationship with conventional 
international law.  Even before entering office, President Obama suggested the need for a new 
perspective in nuclear weapons control:  regulation and possible abolition.
1
  It was therefore with 
much anticipation that public opinion awaited the Obama Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).  
However, the report did not quite measure up to the public’s expectations.  For example, the 
Administration reaffirmed NATO obligations that require U.S. adherence to the policy of nuclear 
deterrence, which does not represent a significant change from past policy.  Nevertheless, strategic 
developments in treaty commitments with both NATO allies and former Cold War opponents 
imply a closer approximation with international law standards regarding the threat and use of 
nuclear weapons.  Therefore, while current U.S. policy generates an expectation regarding the 
threat or use and abolition of nuclear weapons, it still retains an element of nuclear deterrence in its 
strategic posture, which, as indicated, seems to be in tension with international law.  U.S. security 
strategy straddles a delicate balance between unilateral action and action consistent with promoting 
and defending international law in the national interest. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 President Obama has made U.S. nuclear weapons policy a major 
area of concern for his Administration.  In a widely reported speech 
given in Prague last year, President Obama stated that he had a vision 
that was directed at the universal abolition of all nuclear weapons as a 
major purpose or goal of future U.S. nuclear policy.2  To this end, the 
President committed U.S. defense resources to the tactical and strategic 
imperative of a complete review of the complex issues implicated in 
facilitating the realization of a nuclear weapons-free world.3 
 The Obama Administration has generated a multitude of initiatives, 
each connected with complex strategic and tactical policies that are 
critical to a credible shifting of the current paradigm and status of nuclear 
weapons systems.  For example, there is the critical question of how to 
reduce the United States’ considerable warheads and stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons.  Such a goal is tied to developments for the new 
strategic arms reduction treaty with Russia.4  Reduction of U.S. nuclear 
arms is also connected with Obama’s directive to both strengthen and 
broaden the reach of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
                                                 
 2. Barack Obama, President of the United States, Remarks by President Barack Obama 
at Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (Apr. 5, 2009), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_ 
press_office/Remarks-By-President-Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered/. 
 3. Id. 
 4. In April 2009, President Obama and Russian President Dmitriy Medvedev jointly 
declared their resolve to “pursue new and verifiable reductions in [their countries’] strategic 
offensive arsenals in a step-by-step process, beginning by replacing the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Treaty with a new, legally-binding treaty.”  Dmitriy Medvedev, President of Russia, & Barack 
Obama, President of the United States, Joint Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the 
Russian Federation and President Barack Obama of the United States of America (Apr. 1, 2009), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of- 
the-Russian-Federation-and-President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America/.  The United 
States and Russia signed the New START Treaty on April 8, 2010.  It provides the parties with 
seven years to reduce their forces.  For detailed explanation of the treaty’s limits to forces, see 
AMY F. WOOLF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS—THE NEW START TREATY:  
CENTRAL LIMITS AND KEY PROVISIONS (June 18, 2010). 
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Weapons (NPT),5 and with President Obama’s priority of developing a 
legally binding international instrument that will completely prohibit the 
testing of nuclear weapons.6 
 Another complex issue generated by the Obama Administration’s 
activities is the question of how to establish and enforce an effective 
nonproliferation strategy.  It is clear that the United States (in cooperation 
with its partners) will have to confront the presence of nuclear weapons 
in North Korea and (potentially) Iran.7   In the continuing war on 
terrorism, the United States also faces the threat that terrorist groups may 
get their hands on nuclear materials and the ability to deliver and 
                                                 
 5. The 2010 NPT Review Conference took place in New York City from May 3-28, 
2010.  For information on the background to the 2010 NPT Review Conference, see PAUL K. 
KERR ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS—2010 NON-PROLIFERATION 
TREATY (NPT) REVIEW CONFERENCE:  KEY ISSUES AND IMPLICATIONS (May 3, 2010).  This report 
notes: 
The Obama Administration has emphasized in strategy documents that it views the 
NPT as the “centerpiece” of the nonproliferation regime and has pledged to strengthen 
the treaty.  The Administration sees a linkage between arms control and disarmament 
policies and progress in improving the nuclear nonproliferation measures.  The 2010 
Nuclear Posture Review, for example, says that progress on arms control is “a means of 
strengthening our ability to mobilize broad international support for the measures 
needed to reinforce the non-proliferation regime and secure materials worldwide.”  The 
Nuclear Posture Review also says that the conditions for nuclear disarmament will not 
be possible without stronger proliferation controls.  Over the years, NPT states without 
nuclear weapons, particularly from developing countries, have cited lack of progress on 
disarmament as the reason they do not support further tightening of nonproliferation 
rules.  The ability of the Administration to garner international support for its proposals 
to strengthen the nonproliferation regime may be tested at the 2010 NPT Review 
conference. 
Id. at 1. 
 6. “The United States is committed to the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Test Ban Treaty and to its early entry into force, and we will work with the United States Senate 
to help achieve advice and consent to this important international agreement.”  Barack Obama, 
President of the United States, Statement by the President on Indonesia’s Announcement of Its 
Intention To Ratify the CTBT (May 4, 2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-indonesia-s-announcement-its-intention-ratify-ctbt. 
 7. The new National Security Strategy promises to: 
Present a Clear Choice to Iran and North Korea: 
The United States will pursue the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and work to 
prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon.  This is not about singling out 
nations—it is about the responsibilities of all nations and the success of the 
nonproliferation regime.  Both nations face a clear choice.  If North Korea eliminates 
its nuclear weapons program, and Iran meets its international obligations on its nuclear 
program, they will be able to proceed on a path to greater political and economic 
integration with the international community.  If they ignore their international 
obligations, we will pursue multiple means to increase their isolation and bring them 
into compliance with international nonproliferation norms. 
BARACK OBAMA, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 23-24 (May 
2010), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf. 
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detonate them.8  For these reasons, the Obama Administration is also 
taking a hard look at controlling the production of weapons-grade 
materials that are crucial to the creation of nuclear bombs.9 
 At the widest conceptual level, any steps undermining the founda-
tions of nuclear deterrence (for example, the maintenance of nuclear 
weapons and the willingness to use them) confront rigid international 
structures that were originally established within a bipolar political reality.  
The traditional policy of nuclear deterrence was drafted by two principal 
antagonists capable of crafting expectations of stability out of the threat 
of mutually assured destruction.  Contemporary relations between established 
states and shadowy nonstate actors (or even between a conglomeration of 
states and a radically antagonistic single state) would appear to require a 
much more complicated and nuanced policy.10 
 Thus, the Obama Administration confronts a concept of nuclear 
deterrence that must be infinitely broader than the contours of a bipolar 
world.  Simultaneously, any policy of nuclear deterrence would seem to 
be an obstacle to the expeditious realization of a nuclear weapons-free 
world; yet any constraints on the possible use of nuclear weapons by the 
United States may conflict with the framework of existing international 
obligations (for example, NATO agreements).  In light of President 
                                                 
 8. In April 2009, President Obama called nuclear terrorism the “most immediate and 
extreme threat to global security.”  Obama, supra note 2. 
 9. The 2010 National Security Strategy states: 
The American people face no greater or more urgent danger than a terrorist attack with 
a nuclear weapon.  And international peace and security is threatened by proliferation 
that could lead to a nuclear exchange.  Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, the risk of 
a nuclear attack has increased.  Excessive Cold War stockpiles remain.  More nations 
have acquired nuclear weapons.  Testing has continued.  Black markets trade in nuclear 
secrets and materials.  Terrorists are determined to buy, build, or steal a nuclear 
weapon.  Our efforts to contain these dangers are centered in a global nonproliferation 
regime that has frayed as more people and nations break the rules. 
 That is why reversing the spread of nuclear weapons is a top priority.  Success 
depends upon broad consensus and concerted action, we will move forward 
strategically on a number of fronts through our example, our partnerships, and a 
reinvigorated international regime. 
OBAMA, supra note 7, at 23.  In particular, the Administration “will seek a new treaty that 
verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in nuclear weapons.”  Id. 
 10. Following the first detonation of atomic bombs over Japan in 1945, fear of mutually 
assured destruction by reciprocal use of thermonuclear weapons on a massive scale between the 
two Cold War superpowers arguably contributed much of the peace and world order over the next 
fifty-six years.  Over these decades, however, an increasing number of states have acquired 
nuclear weapons (as well as massively destructive chemical and biological weapons).  Thus, “it 
became possible for smaller states and even some non-state actors to change this security 
dynamic through possession and threat of use of these more destructive weapons technologies.”  
DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS 
DESTRUCTION, at xiv (2009). 
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Obama’s declared policy objectives, we undertake to explain the role of 
international law in giving concrete assistance and normative guidance to 
U.S. policy makers, who now proceed along a complex path toward the 
goal of complete nuclear disarmament. 
II. THE RELEVANT BACKGROUND TO THE NUCLEAR AGE 
 In August 1945, President Truman authorized the use of atomic 
weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.11  During a three-day period, two 
bombs were detonated, killing more than 115,000 people (possibly as 
many as 250,000) and injuring at least another 100,000.12  To this day, the 
debate about whether the use of the bombs was morally appropriate (or 
even consistent with international law at the time) continues to inspire 
intense controversy. 
 During the Second World War, however, there seemed to be little to 
no concern regarding the legitimacy of using the atomic bomb.13  Many 
military atrocities were still occurring while the U.N. Charter was drafted.  
While some might argue that the Charter was formed to prevent just 
those types of atrocities, others have argued that the Charter became 
obsolete precisely because it failed to anticipate the extent of the damage 
that could be inflicted using weapons of mass destruction.  Thus, John 
Foster Dulles, the Secretary of State under President Eisenhower, made a 
statement of critical importance to international lawyers when, in an 
article addressing the American Bar Association, he suggested that the 
nuclear age had made the U.N. Charter obsolete.14  Of course, modern 
international law draws profound inspiration from the U.N. Charter, and 
practice has demonstrated that even outdated prescriptive foundations of 
                                                 
 11. Barton J. Bernstein, The Atomic Bombings Reconsidered, 74 FOREIGN AFF. 135, 147 
(1995). 
 12. Id. at 135. 
 13. See id.  Bernstein explains: 
By early 1945, World War II—especially in the Pacific—had become virtually total 
war.  The firebombing of Dresden had helped set a precedent for the U.S. air force, 
supported by the American people, to intentionally kill mass numbers of Japanese 
citizens.  The [pre-war] moral insistence on noncombatant immunity crumbled during 
the savage war. 
Id. at 140. 
 14. John Foster Dulles, The Challenge of Our Time:  Peace with Justice, 39 A.B.A. J. 
1063, 1066 (1953).  During the formation and conclusion of the U.N. Charter, the former 
Secretary of State explained:  “[I]n the Spring of 1945, none of us knew of the atomic bomb 
which was to fall on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945.  The Charter is thus a preatomic age Charter.  
In this sense it was obsolete before it actually came into force.”  Id.  Dulles affirms that had the 
delegates there known “that the mysterious and immeasurable power of the atom would be 
available as a means of mass destruction, the provisions of the Charter dealing with disarmament 
and the regulation of armaments would have been far more emphatic and realistic.”  Id. 
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international law can digest evolving problems and issues.  Nevertheless, 
the nuclear age played an important role in the development of the Cold 
War, and Cold War imperatives tended to ignore or possibly undermine 
the promise and authority of the U.N. Charter.  While the real world of 
effective power was dominated by two hegemons, this fact created 
tensions about the role and efficacy of the U.N. Charter.  We suggest that 
a world of states that more widely share effective power (and are guided 
by a unitary superpower that sincerely seeks to empower this constitutive 
arrangement) must and will return to firm standards of international 
behavior as outlined in the U.N. Charter. 
 From the perspective of the modern law of war, academics ask the 
critical question:  whether the use of this bomb, which produced damage 
that exceeded any specific military objective,15 could be seen as violating 
the principles of military necessity, proportionality, and humanitarian 
concern.  Certainly, there could be an arguable issue of lacking mens rea 
for authorizing the illegal use of such bombs at the time, because these 
weapons were new and had never been used before.16  In contrast, no 
contemporary leader could authorize the use of nuclear weapons with 
this defense.  The more difficult area of analysis is in the balancing of 
perceived security threats and actual peace obtained by the use of nuclear 
weapons.  Even with a modern sense of the catastrophic effects of the 
atomic bombings in 1945, some may find a justified legal account of 
those historic actions, because the use of the bombs had the direct 
consequence of unconditional surrender by the Japanese.  This 
particularly difficult area of international law continues to focus the 
world’s attention on U.S. policy regarding restraint of forces under 
security threat. 
 As long as the precise legal implications of the use of nuclear arms 
in terms of conventional law relating to the ius in bello remains 
                                                 
 15.  
So dominant was the assumption that the bomb would be used against Japan that only 
one high-ranking Washington official, Undersecretary of War Robert Patterson, even 
questioned this notion after V-E Day.  He wondered whether the defeat of Germany on 
May 8, 1945, might alter the plans for dropping the bomb on Japan.  It would not. 
Bernstein, supra note 12, at 138.  Among other U.S. military commanders who questioned the 
necessity of the atomic bombings was Admiral Chester W. Nimitz.  See E.B. POTTER, NIMITZ 386 
(1976) (“Nimitz considered the atomic bomb somehow indecent, certainly not a legitimate form 
of warfare.”). 
 16. There was little knowledge of the effects of the bomb blast on human populations; 
and there was less understanding of the environmental consequences (including radiation 
poisoning) that resulted from its use.  See CHAIRMAN’S OFFICE, U.S. STRATEGIC BOMBING 
SURVEY:  THE EFFECTS OF THE ATOMIC BOMBINGS OF HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI 30 (June 19, 
1946). 
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speculative (as we explain below), the effective power process may reveal 
the leader of the world’s only superpower as the key architect for rules of 
nuclear engagement.  Moreover, the expanding base of treaties aimed at 
regulating (and ultimately abolishing) nuclear weapons would give 
substantial support to the recognition of customary international law 
prohibiting the threat or use (or even possession) of nuclear weapons.  
Thus, the Obama Administration might contribute to the outlawing of 
nuclear arms even as it maintains the position of nuclear deterrence that 
the Administration’s activities aim to establish as unlawful under 
international law. 
III. THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARSHIP 
 Academics have a special status in international law.  They are 
regarded as juris consults.  Credible academic work thus has an influence 
on the state of international law.  Important influential work has produced 
a conceptual map to better understand the framework of world order 
based on the U.N. Charter and the framework of international power 
underlying the creation of the Charter, which is influenced by contending 
and conflicting world order systems.17  In effect, the world order systems 
they described were the global process of effective power, which was 
better described in terms of a bipolar world.18  In this sense, the world 
                                                 
 17. The scholar most responsible for giving international law an important role in the 
nuclear weapons issue was Dr. Emanuel Margolis.  See generally Emanuel Margolis, The 
Hydrogen Bomb Experiments and International Law, 64 YALE L.J. 629 (1955).  Margolis’ work 
generated a rejoinder.  In this scholarly exchange, Margolis presented a conventional view of 
international law to demonstrate the violation of international law by the United States in the 
testing of its thermonuclear weapons in the South Pacific.  The central thrust of his argument was 
that the tests restricted the use of international waters, and these restrictions violated the 
fundamental principle of the law of the sea:  the freedom of the seas.  Id. at 634-35.  Professor 
Margolis conceded that the purpose that the United States had used for closing off vast tracts of 
the Pacific was driven by the fear of damage to users of the ocean in those areas.  In short, the 
objective was to secure humanitarian ends.  Id. at 635.  Margolis also made reference to the trust 
responsibilities that the United States owed to the trust beneficiaries.  Id. at 644-45.  The U.S. 
trust over South Pacific islands was of course a legal product of the U.N. Charter and, in 
particular, the trusteeship system that created it.  Id.  Margolis thus brought a conventional view 
of international law to a consideration of the lawfulness of the U.S. testing of hydrogen bombs in 
the South Pacific and declared that the practice violated the letter of international law.  Id. at 645. 
 18. The scholars McDougal and Schlei defended the lawfulness of the U.S. test in the 
South Pacific on the basis of international law (see Myres S. McDougal & Norbert A. Schlei, The 
Hydrogen Bomb Tests in Perspective:  Lawful Measures for Security, 64 YALE L.J. 648 (1955)), 
but the view of international law that they developed is a theoretically broader and contextually 
informed conception of it.  In this sense, McDougal and Schlei sought to develop the discourse 
about the lawfulness of the test by taking into account contextual factors that a narrow 
conventional view of international law might preclude.  Id. at 655-56.  In their view, the rules and 
principles that Margolis relies on must be seen in terms of the relevant contextual background, 
and the appropriate principles of the interpretation of international legal norms.  Id. at 691.  In 
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process of effective power had significant influence on the idea of world 
order19 based on the constitutional foundations of the U.N. Charter.20  
                                                                                                                  
short, the approach of contextual appraisal must account for the nature of the implicit claim the 
United States is making in testing these weapons in the South Pacific.  That claim is based on the 
background of world order tensions and conflict, which pits the democratic, rule of law-based 
position of the United States against a worldview rooted in totalitarian order.  Id. at 689-90.  This 
claim is further sustained by the necessity of security preparedness.  This is the relevant context in 
which the claims of the United States must be assessed against the rules of international law, 
which now include broader legal standards.  Id. 
 More than that, international law itself is not a frozen system of rules.  It is a process in 
which the major participants continually assert claims and defend those claims and from time to 
time act on them.  Id. at 656-57.  A reference is made to the concept of dédoublement fonctionnel.  
Id. at 657.  In short, in a system of world order that is not highly centralized and specialized, states 
make unilateral claims to further their interests, and would seek to justify those claims on the 
basis that they are a reasonable (in this instance) security competence as judged from the 
perspective of a third-party appraiser.  Id. at 661. 
 19. Historically, the principle of “reasonableness” has been critical in resolving 
competing claims to authority and control over the high seas.  See id. at 660.  McDougal and 
Schlei concluded that the temporary appropriation of parts of Pacific high seas for safety 
purposes was a reasonable use of a common resource.  Id. at 661.  They also point out that the 
inconvenience to the populations of these islands was temporary, involved appropriate 
compensation and also involved consultation.  Id. at 653 n.35.  It should also be noted that 
fishermen who suffered radiation burns on the high seas were also compensated.  Id. at 653.  
These temporary and limited interferences would therefore have to be appraised against the 
security importance of free world values for which the testing of nuclear weapons was an 
important strategic act. 
 The scholarly exchange between Margolis and McDougal should also be seen as part of a 
broader discourse concerning the appropriateness and relevance of international law in 
international relations.  Margolis’ view of international law is one that may fairly be characterized 
as being somewhat legalistic and moralistic in its theoretical assumptions and methods.  Two of 
the most respected international relations theorists of this period provided a trenchant attack on 
international law as understood in terms of legalistic and moralistic procedures and methods. 
 The intellectual leaders of this attack were Professor Hans Morgenthau and Ambassador 
George F. Kennan.  GEORGE F. KENNAN, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY:  1900-1950 (1951); HANS J. 
MORGENTHAU, IN DEFENSE OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST:  A CRITICAL EXAMINATION OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY (Alfred A. Knopf ed., 1951).  In their view, the intrusion of international law on 
foreign policy makers, which by implication include the nuclear posture, was dangerous, 
inflexible and undigested utopianism.  KENNAN, supra, at 95; MORGENTHAU, supra, at 33-34.  
Their work generated powerful rejoinders from McDougal—Law and Power and The 
Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public Order.  According to Morgenthau, the 
“state creates morality as well as law and that there is neither morality nor law outside the state.”  
MORGENTHAU, supra, at 34.  Morgenthau stresses that there is no consensus about the nature of 
international justice and, as a consequence, there is no international society that can be integrated 
in terms of principles of justice and equality as in the nation state.  Id. at 38-39. 
 The role of universal morality and universal international law is therefore misplaced.  As 
misplaced morality, the proponents of legalism cannot distinguish between what is “desirable and 
. . . possible” and what is “desirable and . . . essential.”  MORGENTHAU, supra, at 117.  This is a 
view supported by Kennan as well who stated, “I see the most serious fault of our past policy 
formulation to lie in something that I might call the legalistic-moralistic approach to international 
problems.”  KENNAN, supra, at 95.  This approach would certainly strengthen the view within the 
national security establishment that an important role for international law in the policy process is 
misplaced.  Myres S. McDougal, Law and Power, 46 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 103 (1952); Myres S. 
McDougal & Harold D. Lasswell, The Identification and Appraisal of Diverse Systems of Public 
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Order, 53 AM. J. INT’L L. 1, 29 (1959).  McDougal’s response to both Kennan and Morgenthau 
was that they had a complete misunderstanding of the global system of effective power and the 
possibilities and potentialities of authoritative and controlling decision as a source of critical 
normative guidance and policy clarification in international relations.  McDougal, supra, at 103-
07.  Additionally, their view of international law was a view rooted in an older and limited 
paradigm.  The concept of international law was in our time a much more flexible instrument of 
inquiry and policy guidance.  Id. at 107-08. 
 The central contribution of McDougal in this context was to distance a contemporary 
conception of international law from old-fashioned legalism and the implication in the 
international context that its contributions were utopian.  He sought to replace this by reframing 
the theory and methods of international law away from utopianism and more towards a 
framework of realism and relevance.  See id. at 108.  This provided flexibility and greater 
creativity in the formulation of legal responses to problems in the international environment. 
 The McDougal and Schlei response to Margolis was based on an international law that was 
sensitive to the context out of which the testing of nuclear weapons in the South Pacific had 
emerged.  Context thus served to underline relevance and realism and clarified in a sharper way 
the policy constraints and guidelines that should inform decision making in this context.  
McDougal & Schlei, supra note 18, at 691.  In this sense, the response to the international 
relations specialist was based on a newer paradigm of international law.  See generally Richard 
Falk, A New Paradigm for International Legal Studies:  Prospects and Proposals, 84 YALE L.J. 
969 (1975). 
 Moreover, the McDougal approach provided an important theory and method for appraising 
the lawfulness of testing nuclear weapons in international law.  The approach was sufficiently 
nuanced to take a broader view of the role of self-defense in the Cold War, and it was focused on 
a problem that had practical implications for policy makers.  Additionally, McDougal and Schlei 
made U.N. Charter expectations an important part of the professional discourse in this area and, in 
this sense, they were in effect repudiating the view of Dulles that the nuclear age had rendered the 
Charter obsolete.  Dulles, supra note 14, at 1065-66; McDougal & Schlei, supra note 18, at 686-
87. 
 McDougal concluded the Law and Power article as follows: 
It is urgently to be hoped that attacks upon law and morality which so profoundly 
misconceive law, morality and power, and their interrelations, will not cause many of us 
to mistake the real choice that confronts us.  People whose moral perspectives preclude 
the deliberate resort to violence, except for self-defense or organized community 
sanction, have in the contemporary world only the alternative of some form of law.  The 
choice we must make is not between law and no law, or between law and power, but 
between ineffective and effective law.  It is a choice between the doctrines and 
techniques of power-balancing designed for the problems and conditions of bygone 
days, and contemporary commitments and techniques of power-balancing through 
appropriate international organization that offer hope of progressive and accelerating 
movement toward a unified world community—a choice in sum between, on the one 
hand, illusory doctrines, “old-fashioned” diplomacy, and spasmodic resorts to 
unauthorized violence, and, on the other hand, clear moral and legal commitments to 
freedom, peace, and abundance which are sustained by organized community coercion 
and which invoke, at both national and international levels, all the contemporary 
instruments of power, ideological and economic as well as diplomatic and military. 
McDougal, supra, at 113. 
 To a large extent, the approach of McDougal and Schlei was one that was far from Dulles’ 
repudiation of the U.N. Charter, but was also one with sufficient flexibility to be acceptable to the 
security establishment in the United States.  However, the central message of McDougal and 
Schlei was that international law, appropriately understood, had a capacity to be relevant to the 
discourse and policies relating to nuclear weapons systems.  Despite this capacity, the effect of 
such an approach to international and world order is not without complexity.  Consider: 
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Moreover, to provide some kind of stability in a system in which there 
were pressures to confirm the U.N. Charter’s promise, and pressures to 
change it under the imperatives of realism, the superpowers developed 
                                                                                                                  
A characteristic of a decentralized social system is that the political claims of the 
powerful nation-states serve as legal precedents for other, less powerful, members of 
international society.  Nuclear testing by the United States and the Soviet Union created 
permissive precedents that are very difficult to repudiate.  Relative power plays a much 
greater role in creating precedents than in repudiating them.  There is a kind of 
reciprocity and symmetry operative in international society, as in all social systems, 
that makes the assertion by one state of a legal claim to act in a specified way available 
to other states similarly situated.  Such symmetry owes much to the external aspects of 
the ideology associated with national sovereignty, an ideology that has contributed so 
centrally to the constitutive structure of traditional international law through ideas of 
the equality of states, the absoluteness of territorial jurisdiction, and the doctrine in 
nonintervention.  
RICHARD A FALK, THE STATUS OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 452 (1970). 
 With the death of Dulles, the extremist edge of Cold War foreign policy was ameliorated as 
President Eisenhower himself took charge and proceeded to send out signals of the importance of 
arms control and some form of control over the nuclear arms race.  Additionally, the major 
nuclear powers came to recognize that atmospheric weapons tests were diminishing in importance 
to their nuclear posture.  Moreover, the general concern that a prohibition on nuclear testing in the 
atmosphere would also serve as a kind of indirect limit on the prospect of proliferation. 
 These social developments led to the adoption of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests 
in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313 [hereinafter 
Partial Test Ban Treaty].  The superpowers undertook to promote the importance of the Treaty and 
over one hundred states became parties to it.  In addition, the U.N. General Assembly, effectually 
noting the change of posture of the nuclear hegemons, adopted resolutions that sought to 
universalize expectations concerning nuclear weapons systems. 
 20. The problem of international law and nuclear weapons thus crystallized around the 
view of Dulles that the nuclear weapons problem had rendered the U.N. Charter and international 
law based on the Charter obsolete.  Dulles, supra note 14, at 1065-66.  The practice of the 
dominant nuclear powers reflected a projection of nuclear weapons developments for the purpose, 
so it was claimed, of deterrence.  The further justification of deterrence rested on the principle of 
massive retaliation or mutually assured destruction.  We shall defer an international law appraisal 
of these practices and the claims implicit in them.  However, the world of scholarly discourse 
generated a concern for the nuclear weapons issue, but a somewhat oblique form of concern.  
That concern was the international law implications of the U.S. testing of thermonuclear weapons 
in the South Pacific.  See, e.g., Margolis, supra note 17.  In retrospect, the scholarly initiative 
essentially developed a wedge into the discourse concerning nuclear weapons systems.  This 
wedge became an important bridgehead for developing a relevant role for international law based 
on the U.N. Charter. 
 Returning briefly to the claims which fueled the Nuclear Arms Race of the 1950s and its 
reliance on the principle of deterrence and the threat of mutually assured destruction, it is possible 
to conceptualize these practices as representing essentially claims on the part of the dominant 
nuclear powers to exempt themselves from the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter.  Alternatively, 
the dominant powers represented claims to fundamentally change the Charter expectations 
relating to international peace and security in light of the technological developments in nuclear 
arsenals.  To the extent that deterrence is still a justification for the accumulation of massive 
nuclear arsenals, in particular by the United States and Russia, this claim to change the Charter 
remains a residual and important question.  Problematically, the treaty obligations under NATO 
appear to give some authority to the policy of nuclear deterrence in international law. 
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articulate doctrines that codified their national security expectations.  As 
we will discuss below, the critical issue is how these national security 
doctrines—which articulated and communicated the expectations of the 
critical power brokers of the system—are also generating prelegal norms, 
which in turn influence how international law continues to develop to 
account for the problems occasioned by weapons of mass destruction. 
IV. LEGISLATIVE AND QUASI-LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES TO THE 
CONTROL AND REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY LAW 
 In 1961, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the 
Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear and Thermo-nuclear Weapons.21  This 
declaration stated, “The use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is 
contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and, as such, a 
direct violation of the Charter of the United Nations.”22  The declaration 
also stipulated, “Any State using nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons is 
to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting 
contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against 
mankind and civilization.”23  In 1963, the General Assembly also adopted 
the United Nations General Assembly Resolution 1884 (XVIII), 
regarding weapons of mass destruction in outer space.24  Other efforts by 
the United Nations to shape international expectations regarding the 
status of nuclear weapons in international law included, in 1972, the 
General Assembly Resolution on the Non-Use of Force in International 
Relations and the Permanent Prohibition of the Use of Nuclear 
Weapons 25  and, in 1980, the United Nations General Assembly 
Resolution on the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons and Prevention of 
Nuclear War.26  The 1972 resolution declared the permanent prohibition 
of the use of nuclear weapons and recommended that the Security 
Council take steps to implement fully such a stance.27   The 1980 
resolution went further, declaring the use of nuclear weapons both a 
violation of the U.N. Charter and a crime against humanity, and 
stipulating that nuclear disarmament is essential for the prevention of 
nuclear war and for the strengthening of international peace and 
security.28 
                                                 
 21. G.A. Res. 1653 (XVI), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1653 (Nov. 24, 1961). 
 22. Id. ¶ 1(a). 
 23. Id. ¶ 1(d). 
 24. G.A. Res. 1884 (XVIII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/18/1884 (Oct. 17, 1963). 
 25. G.A. Res. 2936 (XXVII), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2936 (Nov. 29, 1972). 
 26. G.A. Res. 35/152D, U.N. Doc. A/RES/35/152 (Dec. 12, 1980). 
 27. See G.A. Res. 2936, supra note 25, ¶¶ 1-2. 
 28. G.A. Res. 35/152D, supra note 26, ¶¶ 1-3. 
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 In addition to these General Assembly resolutions, two important 
multilateral treaties were generated through the U.N. system.  The first 
was the NPT,29 which entered into force on March 5, 1970.  The second 
was the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which 
concluded in New York on September 10, 1996, but which has not yet 
entered into force.30 
 In terms of soft-law obligations, General Assembly declarations and 
resolutions are emphatic about the issue of the use or the threat of the use 
of nuclear weapons as being completely incompatible with the legal 
values in the U.N. Charter.  In this sense, the General Assembly uses its 
resolutions and declarations process to shape global legal expectations 
concerning the outlawing of nuclear weapons systems.  It remains to be 
determined what normative guidance such instruments might have in the 
actual operations of national security strategy and practice. 
 On the one hand, the agreement between superpowers on atmos-
pheric testing served as an important stimulus to achieve a limited but 
universal legal expectation tied to the issue of prohibiting the testing of 
nuclear weapons in the atmosphere.  On the other hand, the two 
important multilateral treaties (the NPT and the CTBT, which were both 
built on the foundations of scholarly work seeking to challenge the 
lawfulness of testing nuclear weapons) served to provide a broader 
framework of international legal process for providing nuclear weapons.  
The developments of these treaties influenced and were influenced by the 
U.N. General Assembly Resolution 2032(XX), Urgent Need for the 
Suspension of Nuclear and Thermonuclear Tests.31  This Resolution noted 
the mounting concern of world opinion for suspended tests.32  The NPT 
and CTBT provide a firm legal foundation for establishing the important 
role of international law in the control and regulation of nuclear weapons. 
V. THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL PRECEDENT IN THE CONTROL AND 
REGULATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY LAW 
 The earliest case that sought to test the legality of the use of nuclear 
weapons emerged in May 1955, when five individuals initiated a legal 
action in the Tokyo District Court against the government of Japan for 
the injuries sustained as a consequence of the U.S. atomic attack on the 
                                                 
 29. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature July 1, 
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 (entered into force Mar. 5, 1970). 
 30. G.A. Res. 50/245, U.N. Doc. A/RES/50/245 (Sept. 17, 1996). 
 31. G.A. Res. 2032 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2032(XX) (Dec. 3, 1965). 
 32. Id. pmbl. 
 
 
 
 
2010] U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 13 
 
cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki near the end of World War II.33  The 
Japanese court provided a lengthy decision in the case.  Although this 
was a lower court, it received expert advice from three of Japan’s most 
distinguished professors of international law.  In addition, the plaintiff 
witnesses directly gave evidence concerning the effects of the atomic 
attack on these cities.  For example, testimonial was given that “[p]eople 
in rags of hanging skin wandered about and lamented aloud among dead 
bodies.  It was an extremely sad sight beyond the description of a burning 
hell, and beyond all imagination of anything heretofore known in human 
history.”34  The central point of the evidence was to establish that the 
atomic bomb caused indiscriminate suffering and that the unusually 
severe and grotesque pain violated the permissible limits of warfare. 
 Although, for procedural reasons, the plaintiffs were precluded from 
recovering against the Japanese state,35 the court provided a careful 
analysis of why the use of the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki were 
violations of international law.  In formulating the theory of liability, the 
court relied on the principle that the indiscriminate bombing of an 
undefended city was a violation of international law.36  These standards 
the court found in the Hague regulations, which were elaborated in the 
Draft Rules of Air Warfare.37  These rules restrict the right of aerial 
bombardment to military objectives, specifically declaring that 
“bombardment of cities, towns, villages, dwellings or buildings not in the 
immediate neighbourhood of the operations of land forces is 
prohibited.”38  The court also quotes article 22, which forbids “[a]erial 
bombardment for the purpose of terrorising the civilian population, of 
destroying or damaging private property not of military character, or of 
injuring non-combatants.”39  The court concluded that “the act of atomic 
                                                 
 33. Shimoda v. State, Tōkyō Chihō Saibansho [Tōkyō Dist. Ct.] Dec. 7, 1963, 355 
HANREI JIHō [HANJI] 17 (Japan), translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. 212, 212-52 (1963).  The 
decision was digested in 58 AM. J. INT’L L. 1016 (1964).  The Shimoda v. State case garnered 
attention among jurists as the first and (then) only judicial attempt to assess the legality of 
atomic—and, by extension, nuclear—weapons.  See, e.g., Richard A. Falk, The Shimoda Case:  A 
Legal Appraisal of the Atomic Attacks upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 59 AM. J. INT’L L. 759, 759 
(1965) (“The decision thus offers a focus for a more general inquiry into the continuing relevance 
of the laws of war to the conduct of warfare in the nuclear age.”). 
 34. Falk, supra note 33, at 761 (citing 8 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. 212, 214). 
 35. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 229. 
 36. Id. a 214-15. 
 37. Id. at 215. 
 38. Comm’n of Jurists at The Hague, Hague Rules of Air Warfare, in THE LAWS OF 
ARMED CONFLICTS 207, 210 (Dietrich Schindler & Jirí Toman eds., 1988). 
 39. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 215.  These rules were 
among some of the first attempts to control the use of weapons that could not (for various 
reasons) be banned outright.  See GÖRAN LYSÉN, THE INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF 
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bombing on an undefended city . . . should be regarded in the same light 
as a blind aerial bombardment; and it must be said to be a hostile act 
contrary to international law of the day.”40 
 The court’s conclusions were that international law forbids 
indiscriminate bombing of undefended cities and that no principle of 
military necessity could change this legal conclusion.41  The court also 
connected the use of these weapons with the production of unnecessary 
and cruel forms of suffering, analogous to the international law 
prohibition of lethal poisons and bacteria.42  The atomic bomb’s effects 
were more severe and more extensive than these prohibited weapons and 
therefore the use of the atomic bomb was unlawful. 
 The critical question remains as to the effect of the Shimoda v. State 
case as legal precedent.  The Shimoda case is the only adversarial pro-
ceeding undertaken in a domestic court to address the legality of nuclear 
warfare.  In this unique case, evidence was presented on behalf of the 
claimants (all victims who were either killed or maimed by the 
bombings) to the Court, which (with the assistance of juris consults who 
were professors of international law) rendered a carefully articulated 
legal judgment.43  The case raises the implicit question of whether it is 
appropriate and within the boundaries of judicial settlement to adjudicate 
the issue of the lawfulness of nuclear weapons.  The Shimoda case is an 
important precedent for indicating that certainly a competent domestic 
tribunal can render a judicially responsible and important clarification of 
the law in the context of a concrete adversarial proceeding. 
 The Shimoda case at least establishes that the role of law may be an 
important part of the larger landscape of authoritative and controlling 
decision making at all levels; moreover, the fact that the plaintiffs could 
give evidence directly on the effects the atomic blast had on them and 
their fellow citizens was an important formal judicial record that might 
influence and guide policy making in the future.  It is unclear whether 
Shimoda will significantly influence the status of nuclear weapons in 
international law.  However, it stands as an important lonely sentinel of 
justice. 
 The role of law in the form of judicial settlement has also helped in 
seeking to secure an important role for the normative guidance that 
                                                                                                                  
ARMAMENTS:  THE LAW OF DISARMAMENT 41-48 (1990).  The Air Rules were never adopted.  
Comm’n of Jurists at The Hague, supra note 38, at 207. 
 40. Shimoda, 355 HANJI 17, translated in 7 JAP. ANN. INT’L L. at 239. 
 41. Id. at 252. 
 42. Id. at 216-17. 
 43. See Falk, supra note 33, at 760-61. 
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international law might provide.  In 1973, Australia and New Zealand 
sued France in the International Court of Justice (ICJ) concerning the 
legality of French nuclear tests in the atmosphere above the South Pacific 
Ocean.44  Australia and New Zealand sought relief from future testing and 
a declaration that France’s testing program in the South Pacific was a 
violation of international law.45 
 The court’s first action was to issue provisional measures to ensure 
that no action would be taken which would prejudice the rights of the 
other party and that the French government should avoid nuclear tests 
which deposit radioactive fallouts in Australian and New Zealand 
territories.46  The issuance of this order implied an important substantive 
right upon which Australia and New Zealand could rely for the preven-
tion of the infringement of its sovereignty with nuclear pollution; and this 
substantive right derived from customary law rather than treaty law.  
Thus, the interim order carried the implicit promise that the NPT and the 
U.N. General Assembly action (in the form of resolutions and declara-
tions) might have had a radiating effect of creating a customary rule of 
international law that prohibited the testing of nuclear weapons in the 
atmosphere. 
 In 1974, the ICJ delivered its judgment.  During the period involved 
in the ICJ’s interim order, a lower level official of the French government 
had issued a press statement indicating that France’s testing program had 
been concluded.  Copies of the newspaper accounts were forwarded to 
the court.47  Because the French were no longer going to test their 
weapons, the object and purpose of the case (the court concluded) was no 
longer at issue.48  In this sense, the ICJ did not pass on the merits of the 
question and thus did not contribute to the possible creation and 
clarification of an international legal norm that had the quality of an 
                                                 
 44. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1973 I.C.J. 43 (May 9); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1973 
I.C.J. 49 (May 14); Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 253 (Dec. 20); Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. 
Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. 457 (Dec. 20). 
 45. 1974 I.C.J. at 256; 1974 I.C.J. at 460. 
 46. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., ¶ 19; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., 
¶ 19. 
 47. Nuclear Tests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. ¶¶ 20, 28; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 
I.C.J. ¶¶ 20, 26-29. 
 48. The Court explained: 
In announcing that the 1974 series of atmospheric tests would be the last, the French 
Government conveyed to the world at large . . . its intention effectively to terminate 
these tests. . . .  The objects of these statements are clear and they were addressed to the 
international community as a whole, and the Court holds that they constitute an 
undertaking possessing legal effect. 
Nuclear Rests (Austl. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J. ¶ 51; Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.), 1974 I.C.J., ¶ 53. 
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authoritative legal prescription concerning the testing of nuclear weapons 
in the atmosphere. 
 In 1995, New Zealand again took France to the ICJ because France 
proposed to resume tests of its nuclear arsenal in the South Pacific.49  
However, the court declined to uphold New Zealand’s claims, making a 
distinction between France’s promise to withhold from nuclear testing in 
the atmosphere and the impending tests, which were to take place 
underground.50  This decision continued the court’s passive stance in 
assessing developing norms in international law regarding nuclear 
weapons testing. 
 The next major development in the evolution of international legal 
standards regarding the control and regulation of nuclear weapons 
emerged from an advisory opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons.51  The triggering of the advisory 
opinion came from an unusual source, the World Health Assembly of the 
World Health Organization (WHO).  The WHO’s concern was expressed 
as follows:  “In view of the health and environmental effects, would the 
use of nuclear weapons by a State in war or other armed conflict be a 
breach of its obligations under international law including the WHO 
Constitution?”52  In December 1994, the U.N. General Assembly sought 
an advisory opinion on whether “the threat or use of nuclear weapons in 
any circumstance [was] permitted under international law.”53 
 The court handed down its advisory opinion on the above matter in 
1996.  The opinion covered a wide terrain of potentially applicable 
international law.  The court considered, for example, the possible 
relevance of the arbitrary deprivation of life contrary to article 6 of the 
International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.54  It also considered 
the possible applicability of article 2 of the Convention of the Prevention 
and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.55  It also looked at the law 
relating to the protection and safeguarding of the environment.56  The 
court concluded that the most “directly relevant” law applicable to the 
                                                 
 49. Request for an Examination of the Situation in Accordance with Paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (N.Z. v. Fr.) Case, 1995 I.C.J. 288, 
¶ 1 (Sept. 22). 
 50. Id. ¶ 63. 
 51. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226 
(July 8). 
 52. Press Release, Int’l Court of Justice, Request by WHO for an Advisory Opinion:  
Order Fixing Time-Limits, Int’l Court of Justice Press Release 93/30 (Sept. 13, 1993). 
 53. G.A. Res. 49/75K, U.N. Doc. A/RES/49/75 (Jan. 9, 1995). 
 54. 1996 I.C.J., ¶¶ 24-25. 
 55. Id. ¶ 26. 
 56. Id. ¶¶ 27-33. 
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question before it was the law “relating to the use of force enshrined in 
the [U.N.] Charter and the law applicable in armed conflict which 
regulates the conduct of hostilities, together with any specific treaties on 
nuclear weapons that the Court might determine to be relevant.”57  First, 
however, the court made a quick examination of the unique characteris-
tics of nuclear weapons.58 
 The court addressed several provisions in the Charter relating to the 
threat and use of force.59  These include articles 2(4),60 51,61 and 42.62  The 
court also noted that international law does not contain any specific 
prescription authorizing the threat or use of nuclear weapons, nor are 
there rules that specifically prohibit the threat or use.63  The court noted 
that treaties deal largely with acquisition, manufacture, possession, 
deployment, and testing of nuclear weapons.64  Thus, the proscriptive 
reach of treaty laws was found to be limited, especially as certain treaties 
specifically seemed to authorize recourse to the use of nuclear weapons.65 
 When the court examined whether customary international law 
provides a source of law prohibiting the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 
the court found no “customary rule specifically proscribing the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons per se.”66  The court found the emergence of such 
a customary rule hampered by “continuing tensions between the nascent 
opinio juris . . . and the still strong adherence to the practice of 
deterrence.”67 
 When the court examined the breadth of customary international 
law for a more general prohibition relevant to the threat or use of nuclear 
weapons, the court did not find “sufficient elements to enable it to 
conclude with certainty that the use of nuclear weapons would 
                                                 
 57. Id. ¶ 34. 
 58. Id. ¶¶ 35-36 (“[I]n order correctly to apply to the present case the Charter law on the 
use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict, in particular humanitarian law, it is 
imperative for the Court to take account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, and in 
particular their destructive capacity, their capacity to cause untold human suffering, and their 
ability to cause damage to generations to come.”). 
 59. See id. ¶¶ 37-50. 
 60. Id. ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4 (“All Members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.”). 
 61. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 51 (recognizing the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs). 
 62. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 38; U.N. Charter art. 42 (recognizing that whereby the Security Council 
may take military enforcement measures in conformity with chapter VII of the Charter). 
 63. 1996 I.C.J., ¶ 52. 
 64. Id. ¶ 58. 
 65. Id. ¶¶ 59-63. 
 66. Id. ¶ 74. 
 67. Id. ¶ 73. 
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necessarily be at variance with the principles and rules of law applicable 
in armed conflict in any circumstance.”68 
Furthermore, the Court cannot lose sight of the fundamental right of every 
State to survival, and thus its right to resort to self-defence, in accordance 
with Article 51 of the Charter, when its survival is at stake. 
 Nor can it ignore the practice referred to as “policy of deterrence”, to 
which an appreciable section of the international community adhered for 
many years.69 
The court also reviewed the scope of international humanitarian law.70  
Despite finding that the new weaponry has not been explicitly accounted 
for in humanitarian law, the court did not discount humanitarian law’s 
relevancy to the question.71  The critical holding by the court relates to the 
importance of the self-defense/deterrence principle.  The Court observed: 
In view of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons, to which the 
Court has referred above, the use of such weapons in fact seems scarcely 
reconcilable with the respect for [the requirements of law applicable to 
armed conflict].  Nevertheless, the Court considers that it does not have 
sufficient elements to enable it to conclude with certainty that the use of 
nuclear weapons would necessarily be at variance with the principles and 
rules of law applicable in armed conflict in any circumstance.72 
Thus, the majority of the court permits the threat or the use of nuclear 
weapons in the narrow circumstance where the survival of the state is at 
stake.  However, the court qualified this holding somewhat by 
recognizing the importance of the obligation found in article VI of the 
NPT, requiring the states’ parties to negotiate in good faith the issue of 
nuclear disarmament.73 
 The opinion of the International Court of Justice generated a 
significant dissenting opinion by Judge Weeramantry (Vice President of 
the Court), who took the position that the use or the threatened use of 
nuclear weapons was “illegal in any circumstances whatsoever.”74  In his 
view, such threat or use 
                                                 
 68. Id. ¶ 95. 
 69. Id. ¶ 96. 
 70. Id. ¶¶ 74-95. 
 71. Id. ¶ 86. 
 72. Id. ¶ 95 (emphasis added). 
 73. Id. ¶ 99 (quoting the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 
29, art. VI (“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control.”)). 
 74. Id. at 433 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
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violates the fundamental principles of international law, and represents the 
very negation of the humanitarian concerns [that] underlie the structure of 
humanitarian law.  It offends conventional law and, in particular, the 
Geneva Gas Protocol of 1925, and Article 23(a) of the Hague Regulations 
of 1907.  It contradicts the fundamental principle of the dignity and worth 
of the human person on which all law depends.75 
Central to Judge Weeramantry’s approach is the distillation of the 
keynote values embedded in the U.N. Charter.  Addressing the applica-
bility and fortitude of the U.N. Charter, which is at the foundations of the 
new world order’s legal basis, Judge Weeramantry posed the critical 
question, “Did that document, drafted in total unawareness of this 
escalation in the weaponry of war, have anything to say of relevance to 
the nuclear age which lay round the corner?”76  The question is critically 
relevant because, as Weeramantry explains elsewhere, “[t]here is an old 
doctrine in international law known as the Lotus doctrine, which 
represents the [premise] of that which is not prohibited is permitted.”77  
However, “because you cannot in black letters enumerate all the various 
kinds of conduct in this uncertain world which are prohibited,” surely 
there must be “behind the black letter rules . . . an enormous array of 
principles” from which one can establish that an unaddressed kind of 
conduct is effectively prohibited.78  For Weeramantry, these principles are 
reflected directly in the specific articles on the preamble of the U.N. 
Charter.79   These keynote principles are substantially rooted in the 
concept of human dignity.80  At their essence, nuclear weapons hold such 
incredibly destructive capacities that they negate the idea of law, and, in 
particular, marginalize the fundamental human element, which is the 
foundation of law. 
 Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting opinion is an illustration of Grotian 
jurisprudence, which seeks to provide rules to a new world order based 
on the shared experience of humanity.  At the heart of the opinion is the 
principle that nuclear arsenals are simply incompatible with the idea of 
law, legality, and reasoned elaboration.  This premise is related to a 
central question implicit in this Article; namely, how far and to what 
extent lawyers’ interventions (including the powerful intervention of one 
                                                 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 441. 
 77. C.G. Weeramantry, Nuclear Weapons and International Law, 9 MICH. ST. U.-DCL J. 
INT’L L. 255, 257 (2000). 
 78. Id.  For a broader explanation of the purpose of the “keynote principles” underlying 
the U.N. Charter, see id. at 256-60. 
 79. Id. at 257; 1996 I.C.J. at 441-42 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
 80. Weeramantry, supra note 77, at 257-58. 
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former lawyer and legal scholar, President Obama) will improve our 
understanding of the role of nuclear weapons in the context of changing 
world order patterns. 
 Assuming that President Obama means to achieve complete 
abolition of nuclear arms, what effective legal strategies may be deployed 
to secure the agreed-upon objective of complete nuclear disarmament?  
Is it necessary to secure simultaneously a clear, legal, and moral basis for 
holding that the threat or use of nuclear weapons is quite simply a 
violation of international law? 
 There are two vitally important technical matters that international 
lawyers must resolve among themselves, and, having done so, the inter-
national lawyers must then find the means to communicate these 
conclusions to both the political and the relevant technological and 
scientific communities.  The first matter concerns the scope of inter-
national law.  Is the regime of nuclear weapons subject only to the law of 
the lex specialis, or are there broader sources of law that must inform this 
critical legal conversation? 
 In the dissenting opinion of Judge Weeramantry, it is strongly urged 
that the range of applicable international law is not confined to the lex 
specialis of treaty law.  The Judge recognizes the relevant sources of law 
to include: 
1. The international law applicable generally to armed conflicts—the 
jus in bello, sometimes referred to as the “humanitarian law of war”. 
2. The jus ad bellum—the law governing the right of States to go to war.  
This law is expressed in the United Nations Charter and related 
customary law. 
3. The lex specialis—the international legal obligations that relate 
specifically to nuclear arms and weapons of mass destruction. 
4. The whole corpus of international law that governs State obligations 
and rights generally, which may affect nuclear weapons policy in 
particular circumstances. 
5. National . . . , constitutional[,] and statutory [law], [which] may apply 
to decisions on nuclear weapons by national authorities.81 
 Both the majority opinion and Judge Weeramantry’s dissenting 
opinion have embraced a broader view of what international law is and, 
therefore, have in effect sanctioned a broader role for the international 
lawyer in world order matters.  In particular, Judge Weeramantry’s list of 
“sources” suggests that we must broaden our base of sources in order for 
international adjudication to keep abreast of the critical problems of 
                                                 
 81. 1996 I.C.J. at 443 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting). 
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world order amenable to judicial interventions.  This is more than simply 
giving article 38 of the ICJ Statute a generous construction as to the 
relevant, authoritative sources of international law.82  It may be that we are 
also in search of a more useful theory about the sources of international 
law and how to use them. 
 W. Michael Reisman, for example, anticipated just such an 
eventuality in his piece, International Lawmaking:  A Process of 
Communication, in which he sought to provide a practical perspective 
drawn from communications theory about how international law is 
functionally created.83  Professor Reisman suggested that attention be 
given to the identity of both communicator and target audience.84  He also 
suggested that from an observer’s view careful appraisal should be given 
to the “authority signal,” the “control intention,” and the “policy content” 
of a relevant flow of communications.85  These theoretical ideas may find 
fertile ground for reflection in practical contexts of international decision 
making.  This, of course, impacts upon how broadly or narrowly the 
lawyer’s role is conceived. 
 Weeramantry’s second central issue is that of interpretation.  
Assuming arguendo that Judge Weeramantry is correct about the breadth 
of the sources of international law relevant to the problem, what kinds of 
explicit, normative guidance can the interpreter invoke regarding the 
specific prescription and application of international law?  Here, the U.N. 
Charter preamble, as an instrument of goal guidance as well as goal 
clarification, is most useful and insightful.  In his dissenting opinion, 
Judge Weeramantry sought to ground the problem in the context of “six 
keynote concepts,” which embody the global community’s fundamental 
expectations about global constitutive and public order priorities.86  These 
                                                 
 82. See Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 
(entered into force Oct. 24, 1945), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?p1-
4&p2=2&p3=0. 
 83. W. Michael Reisman, International Lawmaking:  A Process of Communication, 75 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 101 (1981). 
 84. See id. at 107. 
 85. Id. at 108. 
 86. See 1996 I.C.J. at 441-42 (Weeramantry, J., dissenting).  The following are a summary 
of the values behind the six keynote concepts found in the U.N. Charter.  The opening of the 
preamble expresses the first standard—that the Charter’s authority is rooted in the perspectives of 
all members of the global community, that is, the peoples.  This is indicated by the words, “we the 
peoples of the United Nations.”  Id.  Thus, the authority for the international rule of law, and its 
power to review and supervise the nuclear weapons problem is an authority not rooted in 
abstractions like “sovereignty,” “elite,” or “ruling class,” but in the actual perspectives of the 
people of the world community.  This means that the peoples’ goals—expressed through 
appropriate fora (including the United Nations, governments, as well as public opinion)—are 
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concepts are vital if the interpretation of international law is to be guided 
by explicit standards of normative understanding.  In short, the 
interpretation of international law (for example, its specific prescription 
and application) may be rootless, arbitrary, and even quixotic if it is not 
subject to explicit standards of normative guidance, which are expressed 
in concrete terms in the U.N. Charter taken as a whole. 
 These standards may influence the strategies of legal argument and 
legal justification concerning the legality of nuclear weapons.  Moreover, 
it would be of value for the nuclear strategists of the Obama 
Administration to consider the approach of both the majority of the ICJ 
as well as the dissent of Judge Weeramantry in formulating the nuclear 
posture of the United States.  One element of the strategy would be to 
take the facts and logic of nuclear weapons and to show them in light of 
these keynote concepts, after the fashion of natural lawyers, that there is 
nothing reasonable in the threat of the possible extinction of the entire 
eco-social process. 
 Another stratagem may be to give a cautious assessment of the 
available corpus of law, in light of the keynote concepts, and to appeal for 
caution and seriousness if states feel compelled to have recourse to 
nuclear weapons, in conduct and operations that are on their face 
                                                                                                                  
critical indicators of the “principle of humanity” and the “dictates of public conscience” as they 
relate to the conditions of war (methods and means). 
 The Charter’s second key concept embraces the high purpose of “sav[ing] succeeding 
generations from the scourge of war.”  Id. at 442.  The drafters clearly did not envision nuclear 
war in reference to the concept of war here. Nonetheless, as the passage contemplates the 
destructiveness of war, an enhanced technological capacity for destructive weapons would 
enhance the relevance of this provision, not restrict its scope.  Id.  This reading reflects a 
reasonable legal interpretation. 
 The third keynote concept is the reference to the “dignity and worth of the human person.”  
Id.  In blunt terms, the eradication of millions of human beings with a single weapon hardly 
values the dignity or worth of the human person.  What is of cardinal legal, political, and moral 
import is the idea that international law based on the law of the Charter be interpreted to enhance 
the dignity and worth of all peoples and individuals, rather than be complicit in the destruction of 
the core values of human dignity. 
 The fourth keynote concept in the preamble is emphatically anti-imperialist.  It holds that the 
equal rights of all nations must be respected.  Id.  Nuclear power institutionalizes hegemony 
(nuclear umbrellas) and destabilizes interstate relations as states face the “need” to possess their 
nuclear arsenal in order to deter the other states from contemplating the deployment or use of 
their own arsenal. 
 The fifth keynote in the Charter preamble refers to the obligation to respect international law 
based not only on treaty commitments, but also on “other sources of international law.”  Id.  The 
entire framework of nuclear weapons perspectives and operations cannot proceed outside of the 
very idea of “law,” or more precisely, the law of human survival that must be the foundational 
precept of modern international law. 
 The sixth keynote point in the preamble of the Charter contains a deeply rooted expectation 
of progress, improved standards of living, and enhanced domains of freedom.  Id.  Extinction or 
the prospect of extinction of the human species is hardly consistent with these aims. 
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ostensibly incompatible with those keynote expectations.  A third 
approach would be simply to acknowledge that the issue of nuclear 
weapons is sui generis.  To do this, one would have to ignore the 
normative guidance of the keynote concepts and have a great deal more 
faith in what states have actually achieved so far. 
 A central question that the ICJ contribution addresses is how a 
major power like the United States considers the question of the 
lawfulness of the threat or use of nuclear weapons.  The advisory opinion 
allowed the court the opportunity to enlarge and focus the legal discourse 
on a vital issue of world order.  In so doing, the court generated 
international law expectations, with an articulate juridical structure for 
addressing the problem.  This structure secures a process of reasoned 
elaboration that is more in keeping with the Grotian tradition than the 
tradition of state-dominated positivism.  We believe that a more generous 
interpretation of the relevant sources, including the treaty obligations, 
and a restrained view of the conditions of reasonable self-defense, will 
provide us with a better working picture of how we must proceed 
expeditiously to approximate the Obama objective of a world free of the 
menace of nuclear weapons. 
 A still more realistic picture of the legal character of the problem of 
nuclear weapons emerges from Judge Weeramantry’s dissent.  Quite 
simply, nuclear weapons point to a legal limit on the capacity for 
universal destruction.  This view should be considered at least as an 
aspect of the legal obligation of parties to the NPT to work assiduously 
towards a world without nuclear weapons.  In any event, the awkward 
truth about nuclear arsenals is that they cannot be reconciled with the 
fundamental keynote expectations of the U.N. Charter and modern 
international law.  They are, or should be, unlawful, and this insight 
should guide future U.S. policy. 
VI. THE LEX SPECIALIS AND THE UNITED STATES 
 The development of specific treaty obligations concerning the 
control and regulation of nuclear weapons in international law may affect 
the timeline for achieving a customary prohibition on the threat or use of 
nuclear arms.  While it appears that increasingly universal restrictions on 
nuclear arms proliferation will contribute to a customary law prohibition 
against obtaining and testing nuclear weapons, it also appears that those 
countries that had nuclear arms prior to the establishment of the NPT 
will retain the right to keep and maintain their weapons under lex 
specialis. 
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 The most important of these instruments for the United States are 
the treaties made with the USSR/Russia on the reduction of nuclear 
arsenals, as well as the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  These treaties are very 
specific, but the critical expectation they generate is that some aspects of 
nuclear weapons policy are subject to treaty-based international law.  
However, the expectations substantively generated are very narrow.  In 
addition, there are two critical treaties of a multilateral character 
generated by the international system.  These are the NPT and the CTBT. 
 The NPT contains an implicit pact in which a small group of 
international players is permitted to have nuclear weapons and the rest of 
the parties to the treaties are prohibited from developing nuclear 
weapons.87  The treaty does contain a loophole in the sense that, under 
article IV, a state has an “inalienable right” to develop nuclear techno-
logies for peaceful purposes.88  Such developments also close the distance 
in which a state may eventually go nuclear.  The NPT also contains a 
provision for continued negotiation—the object of which is complete 
global nuclear disarmament.89  The United States has signed and ratified 
this treaty and is an active participant in the process for ensuring the 
goals of the NPT.  It has been suggested that the CTBT is an 
extrapolation of the obligation to work towards complete nuclear 
disarmament in the NPT.90 
 The United States was a leading force in securing the adoption of 
the CTBT, and President Clinton was the first head of state to sign it.  
The treaty was clearly an important complement to the NPT, since an 
important practical way of preventing proliferation is to prevent testing.  
If a state cannot test its nuclear arsenals, the risk to it of having untested 
devices deployed would be very great.  Hence, the CTBT was an 
                                                 
 87. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, supra note 29, arts. 1-2. 
 88. Id. art. 4. 
 89. The preamble to the NPT declares the signatories’ desire to 
further the easing of international tension and the strengthening of trust between States 
in order to facilitate the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons, the 
liquidation of all their existing stockpiles, and the elimination from national arsenals of 
nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery pursuant to a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. 
Id. pmbl. 
 90. Many states who negotiated the NPT believed that only a Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty could realize the objective of Article VI of the NPT.  See David A. Koplow, 
Bonehead Non-Proliferation, 17 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 145, 150 (1993) (“During the key 
stages of the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the diplomatic representatives from 
West Germany, Sweden, Canada, Japan[,] and other pivotal countries were unambiguous in 
asserting that a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was the crucial ‘effective measure’ that Article VI 
would mandate.”). 
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important step in development of global legal expectations concerning 
the control and regulation of nuclear weapons systems. 
 When President Clinton transferred jurisdiction over the CTBT to 
the U.S. Senate to secure its advice and consent for the ratification of this 
treaty, a well-organized right-wing lobby worked quietly to secure a fast-
tracked hearing and vote for the treaty.91  The hearings were short and 
perfunctory, and the vote defeated ratification of the treaty.  The defeat of 
the treaty sent a signal globally that the United States was moving against 
international efforts to reduce nuclear arms and the threat they posed.92  
In the larger scheme of world order, the defeat of the CTBT also 
suggested that the United States was not committed to the use of 
international law for exercising a degree of control and regulation over 
nuclear weapons.  Because the United States is one of the world powers 
and leaders in this field, its role in shaping global expectations about the 
status of nuclear weapons was to undermine the force of international 
agreements in establishing new normative standards for nuclear weapons 
in international law. 
VII. NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND PRIOR PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 
 In general, U.S. national security policy has adhered to the principle 
of nuclear deterrence.  The policy of nuclear deterrence means that the 
United States will threaten to use (or will actually use) nuclear weapons 
against any adversary that threatens to use (or uses) nuclear, chemical, or 
even massive conventional weapons against the United States.93  This Part 
                                                 
 91. For a close examination of the “U.S. Senate’s previous rejection (and, by implication, 
the nation’s non-ratification) of the CTBT,” see Winston P. Nagan & Erin K. Slemmens, National 
Security Policy and Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 32 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 1, 2 
(assessing “the political process that failed to realize the security values now imperative to U.S. 
national defense”). 
 92. See Craig Cerniello, Russia, China, U.S. Allies Condemn Senate Defeat of Treaty, 
ARMS CONTROL ASS’N, Sept.–Oct. 1999, http://www.armscontrol.org/act/1999_09_10/reaso99 
(“The Senate’s rejection of the [CTBT] . . . drew a barrage of criticism from Russia and China, as 
well as from U.S. allies in Europe and Asia.”); see also Barbara Crossette, Defeat of a Treaty:  The 
Shock Waves; Around the World, Dismay Over Senate Vote on Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1999, 
at A1 (quoting the disappointment of foreign ministers and defense ministers from around the 
world); Senate Rejection of the CTBT:  International Statements and Comment, ACRONYM INST. 
FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, http://www.acronym.org.uk/ctbt/ctbreac2.htm (last visited Sept. 
13, 2009) (expressing statements of regret and disappointment from governments around the 
world); CTBT:  The U.S.’ “Dangerous Hesitance” Imperils Nonproliferation Regime, U.S. INFO. 
AGENCY, Oct. 13, 1999, http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/ctbt/news/wwwh9o13.htm (statements 
from various governments expressing regret at the failure of the U.S. Senate to pass the CTBT). 
 93. For legal analysis strictly addressing the policy of nuclear deterrence, see Charles J. 
Moxley, Jr., The Unlawfulness of the Use or Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 ILSA J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 447 (2002) (assessing the lawfulness of potential use of nuclear weapons by the 
United States pursuant to a policy of nuclear deterrence). 
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explores the positioning of previous presidential administrations 
regarding the long held U.S. policy of nuclear deterrence in light of the 
widely perceived illegality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. 
 The security strategy of nuclear deterrence grew in direct response 
to the Cold War.  In the years immediately following the atomic 
bombings in WWII, President Truman seemed reluctant to formulate a 
national security policy dependent upon nuclear weapons,94 “[b]ut soon 
after the first Soviet nuclear test, official national defense policy 
explicitly included the possible first use of nuclear weapons.”95  Facing 
increasing challenges to U.S. nuclear superiority, President Eisenhower 
made a first-use doctrine explicit in the Administration’s national security 
policy, stating that “[i]n the event of hostilities, the United States will 
consider nuclear weapons to be as available for use as other munitions.”96  
For the duration of the Cold War, both preemption and nuclear overkill 
would remain consistent features of the single integrated operations 
plan.97  However, as the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations addressed 
the increasing infeasibility of a disarming first-strike, U.S. nuclear 
deterrence policy embraced the doctrine of mutually assured destruction 
(MAD).98 
 From the end of the Cold War until the second Bush Administration, 
the U.S. presidencies backed away from MAD doctrine in response to the 
changing nature of threats to the United States.  The U.S. nuclear 
weapons policy on “no-first-use” was first presented at a U.N. Special 
Session on Disarmament in 1978, and was repeated just prior to the 1995 
NPT Review and Extension Conference.99  This policy disavowed the use 
of nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances, yet hedged this 
disavowal against such a broad range of circumstances that U.S. nuclear 
weapons were still available for first use even to preempt a nonnuclear 
attach.100 
                                                 
 94. In the Truman Administration, these weapons were viewed as distinct from 
conventional weapons, as “weapons of terror rather than part of the conventional military 
arsenal.”  David S. McDonough, Nuclear Superiority or Mutually Assured Deterrence—The 
Development of the US Nuclear Deterrent, 60 CAN. INT’L COUNCIL:  INT’L J. 811, 812 (2005).  
Nevertheless, hesitation to include nuclear weapons in national security strategy was as likely 
based on the “scarcity of atom bombs and the limited range of the delivery vehicle (the B-29 
bombers)” as the apparent lack of necessity for nuclear weapons strategy (due to U.S. nuclear 
monopoly) or even the moral disinclination of U.S. leadership.  Id. 
 95. Harold A. Feiveson & Ernst Jan Hogendoorn, No First Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
NONPROLIFERATION REV., Summer 2003, at 1, 2. 
 96. Id. 
 97. McDonough, supra note 94, at 814. 
 98. Id. at 815. 
 99. Harold & Hogendoorn, supra note 95. 
 100. See id. 
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 The second Bush Administration came into power with President 
George W. Bush being a supporter of right-wing sentiment concerning 
the status of the CTBT.  (From the perspective of a campaigning Bush, 
“We can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them 
away with unwise treaties.”101)  Moreover, right-wing senators did not 
believe the treaty was in the interest of the United States and had no 
intention of promoting a Senate reconsideration of the treaty. 102  
Additionally, the Administration had some ideas, reflected in the 2002 
NPR, concerning strategic innovations regarding the deployment of 
nuclear arsenals.  Their major innovation in nuclear policy was the 
development of a nuclear global strike option.103  Quite clearly, the idea of 
a global strike option runs counter to the restraint that had been reflected 
in the developing treaty law as well as developing international public 
opinion in this area. 
 The second Bush Administration also sought to promote the 
development of a newer strategic class of nuclear weapons.  These were 
styled as mini-nukes and bunker-buster nukes—the latter presumably for 
the purposes of targeting global terrorism.104  This approach of the 
Administration coming on the defeat of the CTBT, as well as its 
unwillingness to support it coming up again in the Senate, further 
entrenched the signals that the United States was not particularly 
interested in a multilateral, global approach to nuclear weapons problems.  
The United States gave an indication of this approach by basing its 
invasion of Iraq on the notion that it could invade a rogue state—
unilaterally—if that rogue state was developing a threatened arsenal of 
nuclear weapons. 
 The approach of the G.W. Bush Administration tended to 
marginalize the importance of international law as developed via the 
treaty-making process or the clarifications generated from authoritative 
sources such as the ICJ or, indeed, the U.N. itself.  The expectation of 
obfuscation with regard to the U.S. position on the developing 
international law in this field have increased fears of global insecurity 
                                                 
 101. Interfaith Questionnaire on Elimination of Nuclear Weapons:  US Presidential 
Candidates’ Responses, ACRONYM INST. FOR DISARMAMENT DIPLOMACY, Sept. 2000, 
http://www.acronym.org.uk/dd/dd50/50views.htm.  Then-Governor Bush was responding to this 
question:  “There are interim steps to take in the quest for the elimination of nuclear weapons.  
For example, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty provides a means of controlling the spread of 
nuclear weapons.  If elected President, will you seek ratification of the CTBT by the United 
States Senate?”  Id. 
 102. See Nagan & Slemmens, supra note 91, at 29. 
 103. See id. at 62. 
 104. See Feiveson & Hogendoorn, supra note 92, at 5. 
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causing some states to believe that the surest way to deter a U.S.-led 
invasion is to have some sort of nuclear device as a defense of last resort.  
Such states pin their security expectations on the unpredictability of their 
defense posture as a way of deterring a possible regime change action on 
the part of the United States. 
 To appreciate the impact of the G.W. Bush Administration’s 
approach to the problem of the nation’s nuclear weapons posture, recall 
that the Administration inherited the decision of the Clintonian Senate to 
obstruct the CTBT.  Building on the CTBT’s demise, the Administration 
gave an indication of its approach to the problem of nuclear weapons 
policy in its Nuclear Posture Review of 2002, which represented a radical 
shift from preexisting U.S. policy.  The approach suggested a prioritiza-
tion of the traditional value of credible deterrence and a contemplation of 
future security threats that would require a more flexible and credible 
nuclear deterrence posture.  The central elements of this posture were 
driven by the concern that the Department of Defense had no effective 
tool to attack enemy assets that were buried in deep earth and concrete 
bunkers.  Thus, there was a particular interest in developing “bunker 
busters” and in particular, the possibility of arming bunker busters with 
“mini-nukes.”105 
 The idea of mini-nukes is tied to the idea that if mini-nukes can be 
developed with less environmentally destructive effects, such weapons 
would significantly increase the flexibility of their deployment, and this 
would increase the credibility of deterrence.  What this implied was that 
research needed to be done for the development of tactical nuclear 
arsenals that could be much more easily integrated into the conventional 
armory of the nation so that their use would be routinized in terms of 
defense capability. 
 This would require a completely new warhead design, and, indeed, 
it would also require a new round of testing of such weapons.  In this 
regard, the Bush Administration maintained publicly the U.S. moratorium 
on nuclear testing and at the same time resisted any notion of supporting 
the adoption of the CTBT.106  Along with these positions, there was also 
the development of a nuclear global strike option.  This principle should 
perhaps be understood in light of the articulate Bush Doctrine in the War 
on Terror.  In that doctrine, the President argued for a preemptive right to 
                                                 
 105. See id. 
 106. See Nagan & Slemmens, supra note 91, at 4. 
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self-defense,107 and thus the global strike option would effectually find a 
place in the officially articulated New Bush Doctrine. 
 The idea of developing low-yield nukes had been a matter that had 
been talked about in the Administrations of both Presidents George H.W. 
Bush and Clinton.  Within the nuclear community, important policy 
papers were written to the effect that the U.S. nuclear arsenal had no 
deterrent effect on dictators like Saddam Hussein.  The pro-nuclear lobby 
therefore made the case that there was a defense need for flexible tactical 
nuclear weapons to fill the vacuum in the deterrence posture.  Dick 
Cheney, in his report on defense strategy for the 1990s, argued for an 
increased role for nuclear forces in tackling regional threats, and he 
endorsed the development of new nonstrategic nuclear weapons.108 
 The Bush approach raised deep concerns internationally about the 
interrelated arms control agreements and their currency under that 
Administration.  The central problem was the effect that Bush’s nuclear 
strategy might have on the NPT.  In 2000, the states parties to the NPT 
agreed on thirteen practical steps toward global nuclear disarmament.  
However, the Bush Administration’s plans contradicted several of those 
agreed upon steps.  For example, the 2000 NPT Review Conference 
committed the nuclear powers to the principle of irreversibility 
concerning nuclear disarmament.  The parties also were committed to 
“[a] diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to 
minimize the risk that these weapons will ever be used and to facilitate 
the process of their total elimination.”109  However, shortly after the 2000 
NPT Review Conference, the “first-use” policy articulated by the United 
States at the previous 1995 NPT Review Conference was reaffirmed: 
[T]he United States reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against 
non-nuclear weapon state parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of 
                                                 
 107. Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The New Bush National Security Doctrine and 
the Rule of Law, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 375, 407 (2004). 
 108. “In January 1991, as US forces were deployed to liberate Kuwait, Defense Secretary 
Cheney issued the top-secret Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy (NUWEP), which formally 
tasked the military to plan for nuclear operations against nations capable of developing WMD.”  
Hans N. Kristensen, Nuclear Futures:  Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and US 
Nuclear Strategy 10 (British Am. Sec. Info. Council (BASIC), BASIC Research Report 98.2, 
Mar. 1998) (citation omitted) (citing William M. Arkin, Agnosticism When Real Values Are 
Needed:  Nuclear Policy in the Clinton Administration, Federation of American Scientists Public 
Interest Report, September/October 1994, p. 7.) [del “citing” parenthetical].  “This guidance 
resulted in SIO-P93, the first overall nuclear war plan formally to incorporate Third World WMD 
targets.”  Id. (citation omitted) (citing USSTRATCOM, Strategic Planning Study, Final Report, 1 
October 1993, p. 3-35 (partially declassified and released under the Freedom of Information Act)) 
[del “citing” parenthetical]. 
 109. 2000 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons, Apr. 24-May 19, 2000, Final Document, at 15, U.N. Doc. NPT/CONF.2000/28 (2000). 
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Nuclear Weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the 
United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on 
a state towards which it has a security commitment, carried out or sustained 
by such a non-nuclear weapon state in association or alliance with a 
nuclear weapon state.110 
The position of the Bush Administration posed dangers for weakening 
the legal and political force of the NPT.  The attempt to develop new 
flexible nuclear weapons and the refusal to rule out the use of nuclear 
weapons against nonnuclear states raised a serious question about the 
good faith of U.S. pledges under article VI of the NPT.  Since the CTBT 
has interlocking elements with the NPT, further research into the 
development of mini-nuke warheads and a new generation of weapons 
requiring testing would essentially end the U.S. unilateral ban on testing 
and would radically depreciate the currency and efficacy of the CTBT. 
 The Bush opposition to the CTBT was a position that contrasted 
with the closest allies of the United States.  The legacy that President 
George W. Bush left us is a nuclear policy that distances itself from 
international agreement and international law and rely on nuclear 
weapons systems as the basis of its nuclear policy.  By rejecting the 
CTBT, as well as irreversible arms reductions, and by seeking to develop 
new more usable nuclear weapons in disregard for the NPT agenda, the 
George W. Bush Administration presented genuine threats to the 
development of international arms control institutions that have taken 
years to be put into place.  As the Obama Administration takes on issues 
involved in the regulation of nuclear weapons, one of the most significant 
challenges that the President confronts is to rebuild the foundations for 
the NPT and the CTBT and to correct for his predecessor’s erosion of 
those foundations. 
VIII. CURRENT U.S. NUCLEAR ARMS POLICY 
 The current U.S. nuclear arms policy adheres to nuclear deterrence 
while simultaneously pursuing a path toward complete nuclear 
disarmament.  Part IX will explain how the Obama Administration 
arrived at such a position.  It will also explain how the Administration 
has justified (or will justify in the future) certain inconsistencies 
necessarily resulting from this position. 
 In anticipating the Obama Administration’s NPR, many foresaw a 
complete overhaul of U.S. National Security Doctrine and force 
                                                 
 110. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Daily Press Briefing (Feb. 22, 2002), http://2001-
2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2002/8421.htm. 
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considerations.111  Among the key issues under debate was whether the 
primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack against the 
United States or its allies.  For example, Senator James M. Inhofe (R-
Okla.), a senior member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 
argued: 
United States nuclear weapons must continue to deter not only nuclear 
attacks but also chemical and biological attacks against the United States 
and its allies.  While some reduction in our nuclear arsenals may be 
warranted, deep cuts would be destabilizing and would encourage other 
countries to enter into nuclear competition.112 
Senator Inhofe correctly judges that in the post-Cold War world there is a 
need for nuclear deterrence that is broader than a response to nuclear 
threats,113 but would see national defense as ultimately resting on a far 
more flexible and tactical design for nuclear arsenals to meet these new 
threats.114 
 The Obama NPR was one of the most eagerly anticipated 
documents in the area of national security—in part, because it reflects 
the challenge of his vision for a world without nuclear weapons.  The 
challenge of the NPR was to develop strategic and tactical responses that 
might move this agenda purposefully forward.  Moreover, it was a 
prelude to the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS).  As instruments of 
the official policy of the Executive, these two policy pieces affirm 
important international law expectations.  They also challenge certain 
international law expectations and even some aspects of international law, 
thus staking a claim to change or modify the relevant international law.  
Although the NPR and the new NSS are unilateral U.S. undertakings, 
they are communicated worldwide, and other states (and nonstates) will 
react to them in predictable or unpredictable ways. 
 In the United States, it is an illustration of the President’s vision of 
the future of nuclear arsenals.  For this reason, many expressed 
                                                 
 111. At this point, President Obama had already moved in negotiations with the Russians 
on a new version of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991, which expired on December 5, 
2009.  President Obama had publically expressed his intentions in a speech in early April 2009.  
Barack Obama, President of the United States, and Dmitriy Medvedev, President of Russia, Joint 
Statement by President Dmitriy Medvedev of the Russian Federation and President Barack 
Obama of the United States of America, April 1, 2009, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_ 
office/Joint-Statement-by-President-Dmitriy-Medvedev-of-the-Russian-Federation-and-
President-Barack-Obama-of-the-United-States-of-America. 
 112. Senator James M. Inhofe, Letter to the Editor, Nuclear Policy in a Changed World, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2010, at WK9. 
 113. “United States nuclear weapons must continue to deter not only nuclear attacks but 
also chemical and biological attacks against the United States and its allies.”  Id. 
 114. See id. 
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disappointment when the NPR was issued, finding little change from 
traditional U.S. nuclear posture.115  We disagree, however, with such a 
wholly negative assessment.  Below, we list some of the significant 
changes (or decisions to adhere to traditional policies) found in the two 
policy pieces, and we attempt to address the most pertinent critiques that 
these points have received. 
 To differing extents, the NPR and NSS examined the following 
issues: 
- The role of nuclear forces in the United States strategy planning and the 
programming;116 
- The United States nuclear deterrence policy (including targeting 
strategy); 
- The policy requirements and objectives for the United States to 
maintain a safe, reliable, and credible nuclear deterrence posture; 
- The role that missile defense capabilities and conventional strike forces 
play in determining the role and size of nuclear forces; 
- The levels and composition of nuclear delivery systems that will be 
required for implementing United States national and military strategy, 
including any plans for replacing or modifying existing systems; 
- The type of active and inactive nuclear weapons stockpile that will be 
required for implementing the United States national and military 
strategy including any plans for replacing or modifying warheads; 
- The nuclear weapons complex that will be required for implementing 
the United States national and military strategy, including any plans to 
modernize or modify the complex; 
- The U.S. arms control objectives;117 
- The importance of the international legal system in fulfilling U.S. 
policy goals;118 and 
                                                 
 115. See, e.g., Alexander Cockburn, Nuclear Disarmament:  A Major Defeat, NATION, 
May 17, 2010, at 9 (expressing strong disappointment in the revelations of the nuclear posture 
review and their ineffectiveness at promoting the nuclear disarmament agenda).  “The 
administration did not merely reassert the essential premises of [U.S.] nuclear strategy but used 
the publication of the review and the subsequent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington as 
occasions to intensify threats against North Korea and Iran.”  Id. 
 116. Because “there is no greater threat to the American people than weapons of mass 
destruction, particularly the danger posed by the pursuit of nuclear weapons by violent extremists 
and their proliferation to additional states,” the United States is “pursuing a comprehensive 
nonproliferation and nuclear security agenda, grounded in the rights and responsibilities of 
nations.  We are reducing our nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, while ensuring the 
reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent.”  OBAMA, supra note 7, at 4. 
 117. “We are leading a global effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear materials from 
terrorists.”  Id. 
 118. “We are strengthening the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as the foundation 
of nonproliferation, while working through the NPT to hold nations like Iran and North Korea 
accountable for their failure to meet international obligations.”  Id. 
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- The deterrence policy that will reveal President Obama’s apparent 
concern with the inhuman effects of using nuclear weapons.119 
While these issues do not explicitly account for the importance of 
international legal process in the consideration of the policy options, they 
have significantly illuminated the evolving position of U.S. nuclear arms 
policy and ways in which this U.S. position intends to respond to (and 
even direct) international law standards. 
 The U.S. President’s emphasis on international rule of law is a 
positive method of addressing state outliers who refuse to engage in the 
regulation of nuclear weapons by international law.  The eventual goal of 
complete nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved without first 
commanding a globally unified position on nuclear weapons.  In both the 
media and international relations there have been major responses to the 
inclusion of Israel among the NPT outliers named in the NPT Review 
Report.  Israel, of course, has nuclear weapons but has not signed the 
NPT.120  The change in U.S. position regarding Israel’s maintenance of 
nuclear weapons signals a comprehensive legal strategy to the Obama 
Administration’s nuclear arms agenda.  The move sends the message that 
even close U.S. allies must conform to international legal standards, lest 
they come under the shadow of dangerous U.S. nuclear posturing. 
 More distressing to the pursuit of a nuclear abolition agenda, the 
NPR reaffirms U.S. dedication to NATO’s nuclear planning, which 
inspires tension with U.S. obligations under article VI of the NPT to 
negotiate on “effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms 
race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”121  As a key possessor 
of nuclear weapons within NATO’s strategic nuclear protective stance, 
the United States may need to redefine its role within NATO to conform 
with this provision with the NPT.  (Conformity may require merely the 
elaboration of priorities within standing NATO agreements, making it 
apparent that the protective strategies of NATO include the paramount 
strategy of nuclear disarmament.)  As one journalist effectively points out, 
                                                 
 119. According to Cockburn: 
The crucial sentence in the review, insistently repeated by Obama, states that “the 
United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear 
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-
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“As of 2005, the United States was providing about 180 tactical B61 
nuclear bombs for use by Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and 
Turkey under these NATO agreements,” despite the fact that articles I and 
II of the NPT prohibit the transfer of nuclear weapons to nonnuclear 
states.122  That journalist predicts little gain for the cause of nuclear 
disarmament stemming from the impending redraft of NATO’s strategic 
concept, noting that the last reformulation (in 1999) stated: 
The fundamental purpose of the nuclear forces of the Allies is political . . . 
to fulfill an essential role by ensuring uncertainty in the mind of any 
aggressor . . . .  The supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies is 
provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance.123 
Thus, the point is made again that the United States must bring 
obligations under NATO in conformity with obligations under the NPT. 
 From what we now know, the Obama Administration is interested in 
the developing lex specialis of international law relating to nuclear 
weapons and has placed emphasis on diplomacy, negotiation, and finding 
the space for common-interest activities in which law still plays an 
important role.  The importance of broadening the relevance of 
international law via the lex specialis (as well as through general 
international law) is that it broadens the scope of international obligation 
and creates a normative system of global expectation that is inclusive.  It 
is in the interest of the United States that U.S. strategic and tactical 
changes in the direction of reduced global nuclear threats should carry 
the mantle of credibility that is completely consistent with global 
normative priority.  There is strong global support for arms reduction, 
and in particular, a reduction of nuclear threats to global peace and 
security.  Thus, President Obama’s commitment to the vision of a world 
bereft of nuclear weapons will have greater force if it is underlined by 
international law and which carries the strength of global opinio juris.  In 
short, the NPR seizes upon those aspects of which there is evidence of 
common interest consistent with the President’s declared policy aspira-
tion. 
 In part, the credibility of the President’s policy directives in the 
direction of nuclear disarmament must be tied to the role of science and 
technology facilitating the task of reducing our nuclear arsenals.  This in 
itself is important for international law because law that is context-
sensitive will provide us with guidelines that are useful in facilitating 
these presidential goals. 
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 The American Physical Society (APS) recently outlined a strategy 
for the role of science and technology in facilitating nuclear disarma-
ment.124  The APS underlines three essential tasks for the scientific 
community: 
1) verifying the process of downsizing and dismantling of stockpiles, 
2) sustaining nuclear weapons capability and expertise for as long as is 
necessary, and 3) removing the capabilities for reversals through various 
confidence-building measures, in particular by ensuring the peaceful use of 
fissile materials.125 
The APS recommends a number of important steps that it believes the 
government should embrace.  These steps include the declassification of 
the number of all U.S. nuclear weapons, the establishment of 
international centers for verification, research and validation, the 
refurbishment of elements of the U.S. nuclear weapons infrastructure, the 
support of federal investment in key programs, and the establishment of 
information sharing among nuclear related industries.126  The report 
concludes as follows: 
We are confident that the development of the technology needed for a safe 
and secure downsizing program for global nuclear arsenals is within our 
reach if it is adequately supported.  The associated operational and 
doctrinal measures will require major investments as well.  The technology 
steps are clear; the structure of the overall program requires careful 
assessment and ongoing support.127 
 Since the nuclear weapons problem is one that deeply implicates 
science and technology, modern international law must also come to 
grips with the possibilities and limitations of science and technology in 
order to provide the goal guidance that is both relevant and steeped in 
realism.  One of the central challenges of effective international law is 
that it must avoid specious utopianism and focus contextually with 
realism and discipline.  From the brief discussion above, it is clear that 
the stakeholders of international law must provide a better contextual 
understanding of world order conditions and current security threats, 
including the threats of terrorism.  Such an approach permits us to get 
past the doctrinal constraints of bipolar world order thinking and, at the 
same time, permits us to focus more clearly on the nature of security 
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threats, which may facilitate or limit the achievement of the goals of 
nuclear disarmament.  In addition, the nuclear weapons problem is one 
that deeply implicates science and technology.  A relevant role from 
modern international law is to come to grips with the possibilities and 
limitations of science and technology in order to provide the goal 
guidance that is both relevant and steeped in realism. 
X. CONCLUSION 
 The legal status of nuclear weapons poses a difficult, classical 
problem of the clash between law and effective power.  It was this 
juxtaposition that J.F. Dulles recognized when he suggested that the sheer 
power of nuclear weapons represented a reality that transcended the 
international law of the U.N. Charter.128  The control and management of 
nuclear arsenals and how they are produced and deployed have been 
matters over which there has been significant contention with the U.S. 
government.  Nuclear weapons are such a high priority for national 
security matters that the high security issues implicated seem to be more 
suited to decision making within the class of national security operatives.  
The perspective of the national security operative draws on a tradition of 
intellectual thought that sees international relations as largely a matter of 
exclusively manipulating the national power posture of a state.  Theorists 
such as Morgenthau and Kennan expressed impatience with international 
law having any important role in international relations involving 
important security matters.  In their view, international law was a 
dangerous utopian artifact.129  Its specialized language, which came 
packaged with a culture of legalism, was irrelevant and possibly 
dangerous to the appropriate management of foreign relations in a 
nuclear age.  Regrettably, their target of attack was an older version of 
international law—one not influenced by functionalism or by context-
sensitive analysis.  It is this latter view of international law that has 
demonstrated a capacity for realism, a challenge to unreflective 
policymaking, and a willingness to clarify the appropriate role for law 
broadly conceived in the control and regulation of nuclear weapons.  In 
this, it has succeeded in seeking to bring reason to bear on the possibly 
unrestrained exercise of raw power, which could include the destructive 
force of nuclear arsenals.  In this sense, President Obama’s decision to 
look to a world free of the threat of nuclear destruction is in keeping with 
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the tradition of law that insists on the importance of reason as an 
appropriate limit on the unrestrained exercise of power. 
 While proceeding along a complex path toward the goal of 
complete disarmament, confronting a concept of nuclear deterrence 
infinitely broader than the contours of a bipolar world, the Obama 
Administration presents an evolved position in U.S. nuclear arms 
policy—one that directly engages with and directs the standards of 
international law.  Commanding a globally unified position on nuclear 
weapons (while maintaining the framework of existing international 
obligations that permits the world’s only superpower to act as the key 
architect for nuclear engagement) signals a comprehensive legal strategy 
to the Obama Administration’s nuclear arms agenda.  President Obama 
might successfully contribute to an outlawing of nuclear arms even as the 
United States maintains the position of nuclear deterrence that the 
President’s activities aim to establish as unlawful under international law.  
As a former lawyer and legal scholar, President Obama seems to be using 
effective strategies of both law and power to build a foundation of 
international law that will support the process of complete nuclear 
disarmament, even after this President no longer wields power. 
